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Discrete-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocols are promising candi-
dates for large-scale deployment due to the large technological overlap with deployed modern optical
communication devices. The security of discrete modulation schemes has previously analyzed in the
ideal detector scenario in the asymptotic limit. In this work, we calculate asymptotic key rates
against collective attacks in the trusted detector noise scenario. Our results show that we can thus
cut out most of the effect of detector noise and obtain asymptotic key rates similar to those had we
access to ideal detectors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] is a key
establishment protocol with the provable information-
theoretic security. Various QKD protocols with differ-
ent advantages have been proposed, analyzed and imple-
mented. See e.g. [3–5] for reviews. Continuous-variable
(CV) QKD protocols [6–9] have competitive advantages
in terms of massive deployment due to a significant over-
lap of devices used with those in the optical classical
communications. Many experiments of CVQKD on both
Gaussian modulation schemes such as Refs. [10–15] and
discrete modulation schemes like Refs. [16–20] have been
demonstrated.
On the one hand, Gaussian modulation schemes are
simpler to analyze theoretically than discrete modula-
tion systems, and they give secret key rates close to
the theoretical limits [21, 22]. On the other hand, con-
tinuous modulation itself is usually only approximated
by a (relatively large) set of discrete modulation set-
tings. This approximation needs to be taken into ac-
count during the full security analysis (see e.g. [23–25]).
Moreover, as Gaussian modulation schemes often require
more resources in terms of randomness and classical post-
processing resources, discrete modulation schemes thus
offer further simplification of implementation. However,
in previous experimental demonstrations of discrete mod-
ulation schemes, either only effective entanglement has
been verified [16, 18] which is a necessary pre-condition
for QKD or security has been established only against a
restricted subset of collective attacks [17, 19]. By now,
there are asymptotic security proofs against arbitrary col-
lective attacks for binary [26], ternary [27] as well as qua-
ternary modulation schemes and beyond [28, 29]. Pre-
vious proofs for a general discrete modulation scheme
[28, 29] investigate the untrusted detector noise scenario
where the imperfection of detectors can be controlled by
Eve (and thus one can treat detectors as ideal). In real-
ity, the amount of electronic noise of an off-the-shelf ho-
modyne detector in a CVQKD experiment can be much
higher than the channel excess noise. As a result, the key
rate in the untrusted detector noise scenario drops very
quickly to zero as the transmission distance increases.
However, since detectors are securely located in Bob’s
laboratory where Eve is unable to access, it is reasonable
to assume that Eve does not control detector imperfec-
tions especially those noise sources that are on the elec-
tronic circuitry, which is more remote from the quantum
mechanical part of the signal detection.
In this work, we extend our previous analysis [29] to
the trusted detector noise scenario where detector imper-
fections (detector inefficiency and electronic noises) are
not accessible to Eve. We remark that Gaussian modula-
tion schemes have been analyzed in the trusted detector
noise scenario and these studies show the effects of elec-
tronic noise and detector inefficiency on the key rates are
not very significant in the trusted detector noise scenario
[10, 30] compared to the ideal detector scenario. As we
show in this work, this observation also holds for discrete
modulation schemes. However, we emphasize that our
analysis is not a trivial application of the method used
for Gaussian modulation protocols and instead we adopt
a different approach. The reason is that the previous
method used in the Gaussian modulation protocols re-
lies on the fact [31, 32] that the optimal Eve’s attacks
for Gaussian modulation schemes correspond to Gaus-
sian channels which make it easy to decouple the trusted
detector noise from the channel noise when one looks
at the covariance matrix. However, we cannot assume
Gaussian channels here since Gaussian attacks are not
expected to be optimal for discrete modulation schemes.
In our analysis, based on a (commonly used) quantum
optical model of the imperfect detector, we find its cor-
responding mathematical description in terms of posi-
tive operator-valued measure (POVM) and then use this
POVM to construct observables corresponding to quanti-
ties that are measured experimentally. These observables
are then used in our security proof. We also point out
the crucial difference between our analysis and Ref. [33]
for discrete modulation schemes: Our asymptotic analy-
sis is valid against arbitrary collective attacks while Ref.
[33] uses the Gaussian channel assumption and thus its
security analysis [33] is restricted to Gaussian collective
attacks.
Our main contributions of this work are finding a suit-
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2able POVM description of a noisy heterodyne detector
and revising our previous analysis [29] by using a new
set of constraints from this POVM in the numerical key
rate optimization problem [34, 35]. Similar to our pre-
vious analysis, this method is applicable to both direct
reconciliation and reverse reconciliation schemes. More-
over, we also study the postselection of data [7] in the
trusted detector noise scenario. As a concrete example,
we apply our method to the quadrature phase-shift key-
ing scheme with heterodyne detection and focus on the
reverse reconciliation scheme. Our analysis here is still
restricted to the asymptotic regime against collective at-
tacks and we make the same photon-number cutoff as-
sumption as in the previous works [28, 29] to truncate
the infinite-dimensional Hilbert space in order to perform
the numerical calculation. From the numerical observa-
tion, we believe the results do not depend on the choice
of cutoff when it is appropriately chosen. We direct the
discussion about this assumption to Sec. III B of Ref.
[29] and leave it for future work to provide an analytical
justification of this assumption beyond the numerical ev-
idences. To extend our analysis to the finite-key regime,
we remark that we have recently extended the numerical
method of Ref. [35] on which our analysis is based to
include finite key analysis [36]. However, there remain
some technical challenges to solve before we can apply
this method to this protocol and thus we leave the finite
key analysis for future work.
The rest of paper is outlined as follows. In Sec. II, we
review the protocol and proof method in Ref. [29]. We
then present a trusted detector noise model and the cor-
responding POVM description in Sec. III. In Sec. IV, we
modify the key rate optimization problem to take trusted
detector noise into account. We discuss our simulation
method in Sec. V. We show the simulation results with-
out postselection in Sec. VI and with postselection in
Sec. VII. Finally, we summarize the results and provide
insights for future directions in Sec. VIII. We present
technical details in the Appendices.
II. BACKGROUND
Our key rate calculation in the trusted detector noise
scenario uses a similar proof method as in our previous
work [29]; that is, we numerically perform the key rate
optimization problem [35] with a modified set of con-
straints. In particular, we discuss how to modify the
key rate optimization problem in Sec. IV based on the
POVM description of a noisy heterodyne detector in Sec.
III. To help understand this modification, we first review
main ideas of the proof in Ref. [29].
For illustration, we focus on the quadrature phase-shift
keying scheme with heterodyne detection. We remark
that since the previous proof can be generalized to other
discrete modulation schemes beyond four coherent states
at the cost of more computational resources, our modi-
fied analysis for the trusted detector noise scenario can
also be generalized in the same way. Moreover, one can
apply a similar idea presented in this paper to study the
homodyne detection scheme in the presence of trusted
detector noise.
A. Quadrature phase-shift keying protocol
To begin with, we review the quadrature phase-shift
keying (QPSK) scheme with heterodyne detection. The
quantum part of the protocol consists of many repetitions
of the following two steps: (1) Alice obtains a uniformly
random number x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, selects the state |αx〉 =∣∣∣αe 2ixpi 〉 from the set {|α〉 , |iα〉 , |−α〉 , |−iα〉} according
to the value of x, and sends it to Bob. (2) Bob applies the
heterodyne detection to the received state and obtains a
measurement outcome y ∈ C.
After the quantum communication phase of the proto-
col, they proceed with the usual classical postprocessing
part of a QKD protocol including announcement, sifting,
parameter estimation, key map (with discretization), er-
ror correction and privacy amplification (see Ref. [29] for
a more detailed description). We highlight the key map
step below.
In the case of reverse reconciliation, for each mea-
surement outcome y written as y = |y|eiθ, where θ ∈
[−pi4 , 7pi4 ), Bob obtains a discretized value z according to
the following rule:
z =
{
j, if θ ∈ [ (2j−1)pi4 , (2j+1)pi4 ) & |y| ≥ ∆a
⊥, otherwise, (1)
where j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and ∆a is a postselection parame-
ter that needs to be optimized for the selected protocol
and experimental parameters [37]. A protocol without
postselection corresponds to setting ∆a = 0.
To perform the postselection of data in combination of
reverse reconciliation, Bob announces positions where he
obtains the value ⊥. After removing the positions related
to the value ⊥, Alice’s string ~X consists of her random
number x’s in the remaining positions, and Bob’s raw
key string ~Z consists of his discretized outcome z’s left.
(Alternatively, they may choose to announce and keep
positions related to the value ⊥ and let the privacy ampli-
fication subprotocol effectively remove those positions.)
Alice and Bob may decide to recast their strings to bi-
nary strings before or during the error correction step de-
pending on their choice of the error-correction code. For
the consistency of our presentation, we use the alpha-
bet {0, 1, 2, 3} and let X and Z denote the single-round
version of ~X and ~Z, respectively.
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FIG. 1. Key map for quadrature phase-shift keying scheme
in terms of Bob’s measurement outcome y ∈ C. Each col-
ored region Aj corresponds to a discretized key value j. The
measurement outcome in the central disk with a radius ∆a is
discarded during the postselection of data and is mapped to
the symbol ⊥.
B. Review of security proof method
1. Source-replacement scheme
The first step of our security proof is to apply the
source-replacement scheme [38–41] to obtain an equiv-
alent entanglement-based scheme for the given prepare-
and-measure protocol. Then we proceed to prove the
security of the entanglement-based scheme.
Given Alice’s state ensemble {|αx〉 , px} (where px = 14
for this protocol) for her preparation in the prepare-and-
measure scheme, Alice effectively prepares a bipartite
state |Ψ〉AA′ in the source-replacement scheme, which is
defined as
|Ψ〉AA′ =
3∑
x=0
√
px |x〉A |αx〉A′ , (2)
where {|x〉} is an orthonormal basis for register A. Then
Alice sends the register A′ to Bob via an insecure quan-
tum channel and keeps register A for her measurement
described by the POVM MA = {MAx = |x〉〈x| : x ∈
{0, 1, 2, 3}}. The quantum channel that maps register A′
to Bob’s register B is described by a completely positive
(CP) trace-preserving (TP) map, EA′→B and is assumed
to be under Eve’s control. Thus, Alice and Bob’s joint
state ρAB before their measurements is
ρAB = (idA⊗EA′→B)(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|AA′), (3)
where idA is the identity channel on Alice’s system A.
When Alice performs a local measurement using her
POVM {MAx } on register A and obtains an outcome
x, she effectively sends the coherent state |αx〉 to Bob.
Bob’s received state ρxB conditioned on Alice’s choice of
x is
ρxB =
1
px
TrA[ρAB(|x〉〈x|A ⊗ 1B)]. (4)
Bob applies his POVM MB = {MBy } to register B to ob-
tain his measurement outcomes. In the case of untrusted
detector noise (or ideal heterodyne detector), the POVM
of the heterodyne detection is {Ey = 1pi |y〉〈y| : y ∈ C},
where |y〉 denotes a coherent state with complex ampli-
tude y.
2. Key rate optimization
The next step is to formulate the key rate optimization
problem for the entanglement-based scheme. One can
rewrite the well-known Devetak-Winter formula [42] into
the following form [34, 35]
R∞ = min
ρAB∈S
D
(
G(ρAB)||Z[G(ρAB)]
)
− ppassδEC , (5)
where δEC is the actual amount of information leakage
per signal pulse in the error-correction step, D(ρ||σ) =
Tr(ρ log2 ρ)−Tr(ρ log2 σ) is the quantum relative entropy
between two (subnormalized) density operators ρ and σ,
G is a CP, trace non-increasing map for post-processing
and Z is a pinching quantum channel for accessing re-
sults of the key map. The set S contains all density
operators compatible with experimental observations. A
more detailed discussion about the map G can be found
in Appendix A of Ref. [29]. For the reverse reconciliation
scheme, we can express the cost of error correction δEC
by
δEC = H(Z)− β I(X;Z), (6)
where H(Z) is the Shannon entropy of the raw key Z, β is
the reconciliation efficiency of the chosen error-correction
code, and I(X;Z) is the classical mutual information be-
tween X and Z.
Before we review the set of constraints as well as G and
Z maps for the quadrature phase-shift keying scheme, we
start with basic definitions. Given the annihilation op-
erator aˆ and creation operator aˆ† of a single-mode state
with the usual commutation relation [aˆ, aˆ†] = 1, we de-
fine the quadrature operators qˆ and pˆ, respectively, as
qˆ =
1√
2
(aˆ† + aˆ), pˆ =
i√
2
(aˆ† − aˆ). (7)
They obey the commutation relation [qˆ, pˆ] = i1. To uti-
lize the second-moment observations 〈qˆ2〉 and 〈pˆ2〉 to con-
strain ρAB , we previously defined the following two oper-
ators nˆ = 12 (qˆ
2+pˆ2−1) = aˆ†aˆ and dˆ = qˆ2−pˆ2 = aˆ2+(aˆ†)2
4[29]. The relation between these observables and the het-
erodyne detection POVM is highlighted in Sec. IV A.
For the untrusted detector noise (or ideal heterodyne
detector) scenario, the key rate optimization problem [29]
is
minimize D
(G(ρAB)||Z[G(ρAB)])
subject to
Tr[ρAB(|x〉〈x|A ⊗ qˆ)] = px〈qˆ〉x,
Tr[ρAB(|x〉〈x|A ⊗ pˆ)] = px〈pˆ〉x,
Tr[ρAB(|x〉〈x|A ⊗ nˆ)] = px〈nˆ〉x,
Tr
[
ρAB(|x〉〈x|A ⊗ dˆ)
]
= px〈dˆ〉x,
Tr[ρAB ] = 1,
TrB [ρAB ] =
3∑
i,j=0
√
pipj 〈αj |αi〉 |i〉〈j|A ,
ρAB ≥ 0,
(8)
where the index x runs over the set {0, 1, 2, 3} and
〈qˆ〉x, 〈pˆ〉x, 〈nˆ〉x, and 〈dˆ〉x denote the corresponding expec-
tation values of operators qˆ, pˆ, nˆ, and dˆ for the conditional
state ρxB , respectively.
As indicated in Fig. 1, the protocol can perform post-
selection of data. To perform postselection, we defined
the region operators as
Rj =
1
pi
∫ ∞
∆a
∫ (2j+1)pi
4
(2j−1)pi
4
r
∣∣reiθ〉〈reiθ∣∣ dθ dr (9)
for j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. The area of integration for each oper-
ator corresponds to a region shown in Fig. 1.
The postprocessing map G in the reverse reconciliation
scheme is given by G(σ) = KσK† for any input state σ,
where the Kraus operator K is
K =
3∑
z=0
|z〉R ⊗ 1A ⊗ (
√
Rz)B . (10)
The pinching quantum channel Z is given by projections
{|j〉〈j|R ⊗ 1AB : j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}} as
Z(σ) =
3∑
j=0
(|j〉〈j|R ⊗ 1AB)σ(|j〉〈j|R ⊗ 1AB). (11)
III. NOISY HETERODYNE DETECTION
In this section, we present our physical model for a
noisy heterodyne detector and give the corresponding
POVM description. We start with a general situation
and then make a simplification for the ease of calcula-
tion.
A. Trusted detector noise model
As a heterodyne detector consists of two homodyne
detectors and a beam splitter, we consider imperfections
in each homodyne detector. A homodyne detector may
have non-unity detector efficiency and also have some
amount of electronic noise which is the additional noise
introduced to the measured data by its electronic com-
ponents. In an experiment, one is able to obtain the
amount of electronic noise and the value of detector effi-
ciency by a calibration routine. To model a realistic ho-
modyne detector with non-unity detector efficiency and
some amount of electronic noise, we use a quantum op-
tical model which is used in Refs. [10, 30, 33], although
the source of this electronic noise is in the actual elec-
tronics part. An alternative view of the electronic noise
is that we can think about the detector as being a per-
fect detector followed by some classical postprocessing of
the data, which adds noise. One should note that in a
trusted device scenario, the characterization of the ac-
tual noise should be experimentally verified. Our phys-
ical model is chosen for convenience of calculating the
POVM. We depict this physical model of a noisy hetero-
dyne detector in Fig. 2 and in this diagram, we consider
the general case of non-identical detectors since these two
homodyne detectors used in an experiment may have dif-
ferent imperfections. We label the efficiency of the homo-
dyne detector used for q-quadrature measurement as η1
and its electronic noise as ν1. Similarly, the efficiency of
the homodyne detector used for p-quadrature measure-
ment is labeled as η2 and its electronic noise is labeled
as ν2. As our treatment for both homodyne detectors
in this heterodyne setup is identical, we take one homo-
dyne detector as an example and we treat the other one
similarly by using its corresponding efficiency and elec-
tronic noise. To model an imperfect homodyne detector
with its efficiency η1 and electronic noise ν1, we insert a
beam splitter before a perfect homodyne detector. The
ratio of transmission to reflection of this beam splitter is
η1 : 1−η1. One input port of this beam splitter is the sig-
nal pulse and the other input port is a thermal state used
to model electronic noise, which is equivalent to sending
one mode of the EPR state to the beam splitter. To re-
late this thermal state to the amount of electronic noise
ν1, the variance of each quadrature for the thermal state
is 12 (1 + 2n¯1), where n¯1 =
ν1
2(1−η1) is the mean photon
number of this thermal state.
In later sections, we choose to consider a simplified sce-
nario where these two homodyne detectors are identical
for the purpose of illustration and the ease of numerical
calculation. That is, they both have the same detector
efficiency η1 = η2 = ηd and the same electronic noise
ν1 = ν2 = νel.
5FIG. 2. A physical model for a noisy heterodyne detector.
The homodyne detector for the q-quadrature measurement
has detector efficiency η1 and electronic noise ν1. The homo-
dyne detector for the p-quadrature measurement has detector
efficiency η2 and electronic noise ν2. The notation ρth(n¯)
stands for a thermal state with a mean photon number n¯.
In particular, n¯1 =
ν1
2(1−η1) and n¯2 =
ν2
2(1−η2) . Beam splitters
are 50:50 unless specified otherwise. Each homodyne detector
inside a gray box is ideal. LO stands for local oscillator.
B. POVM description
When two homodyne detectors give two real numbers
q and p for quadrature measurements, we label the out-
come as y = q + ip. We use the Wigner function for-
mulation to find the POVM {Gy : y ∈ C} corresponding
to this noisy heterodyne detector model. By considering
Tr(Gyρ) for an arbitrary input density operator ρ to the
noisy heterodyne detector, we are able to find the Wigner
function WGy of the POVM element Gy as
WGy (γ) =
1√
η1η2pi
2
pi
1√
1 + 2(1−η1+ν1)η1
1√
1 + 2(1−η2+ν2)η2
× exp
(−2[Re(γ)− 1√η1 Re(y)]2
1 + 2(1−η1+ν1)η1
)
× exp
(−2[Im(γ)− 1√η2 Im(y)]2
1 + 2(1−η2+ν2)η2
)
.
(12)
The full derivation is shown in Appendix A.
As we later need to perform the numerical key rate
optimization and impose the same photon-number cut-
off assumption [29], we need to obtain a photon-number
basis representation of Gy. In principle, one may use the
Wigner function description of |n〉〈m| to find 〈m|Gy |n〉
given the Wigner function of Gy in Eq. (12). To ease our
calculation, we consider a simpler case where we treat
two homodyne components as identical, that is, we set
η1 = η2 = ηd and ν1 = ν2 = νel in Eq. (12) and it is
simplified to be
WGy (γ) =
1
ηdpi
2
pi
1
1 + 2(1−ηd+νel)ηd
exp
 −2
∣∣∣γ − y√ηd ∣∣∣2
1 + 2(1−ηd+νel)ηd
.
(13)
The reason for this simplification is that instead of per-
forming numerical integration to find the matrix elements
of Gy and operators defined in terms of Gy, we are able
to obtain an analytical (more efficiently computable) ex-
pression for each such operator. Since this Wigner func-
tion in this simpler case is that of a displaced thermal
state up to a prefactor 1/(ηdpi), we see this POVM el-
ement is a scaled projection onto a displaced thermal
state. More precisely,
Gy =
1
ηdpi
Dˆ(
y√
ηd
)ρth(
1− ηd + νel
ηd
)Dˆ†(
y√
ηd
), (14)
where Dˆ( y√ηd ) is the displacement operator with the
amount of displacement y√ηd and ρth(
1−ηd+νel
ηd
) is a ther-
mal state with the mean photon number 1−ηd+νelηd , which
can be expressed in the photon-number basis as
ρth(n¯) =
∞∑
n=0
n¯n
(1 + n¯)n+1
|n〉〈n| . (15)
Analytical expressions of matrix elements 〈m|Gy |n〉 are
known in the literature [43] and shown in Appendix B.
Let us add a few remarks about this simplification.
In the case of non-identical homodyne detectors in an
experimental setup, one may choose to apply our sim-
plified analysis [that is, using the POVM in Eq. (14)]
by setting the value of ηd as max(η1, η2) and the value
of νel as min(ν1, ν2). The additional loss and noise are
then attributed to Eve. This simplification can produce
almost tight key rates as long as the differences between
two homodyne detectors are sufficiently small. Alterna-
tively, one may choose to use the expression of Gy in the
general case whose Wigner function is given in Eq. (12)
and obtain the matrix elements Gy via numerical inte-
gration. We emphasize that the principles presented in
this work also hold for the general case and we choose to
present results based on this simpler case for the ease of
calculation.
IV. KEY RATE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
We start with a reformulation of the optimization
problem in Eq. (8) in the untrusted detector noise sce-
nario which serves as a basis for our modification in the
trusted detector noise scenario. The purpose of this re-
formulation is that once we substitute the POVM of the
noisy heterodyne detector in place of the one for the
ideal heterodyne detector, we can easily formulate the
optimization problem in the trusted detector noise sce-
nario. Specifically, we change Bob’s POVM {MBy } from
6the ideal heterodyne detection {Ey = 1pi |y〉〈y|} to the
POVM description of the noisy heterodyne detection Gy
found in Eq. (14). Moreover, some constraints are mod-
ified to match with how data are processed in a typical
experiment.
A. Reformulation of the optimization problem in
the untrusted detector noise scenario
We reconsider the key rate optimization problem in the
untrusted detector noise scenario by rewriting region op-
erators in Eq. (9) and observables in Eq. (8) in terms of
the POVM of an ideal heterodyne detector {Ey}. In the
case of ideal heterodyne detection, the POVM descrip-
tion of Bob’s measurement {MBy } isMBy = Ey = 1pi |y〉〈y|,
the projection onto a coherent state |y〉. By writing
y = reiθ in the polar coordinate and integrating over
the corresponding region Aj , we obtain Eq. (9). If we
rewrite Eq. (9) in terms of MBy , we see region operators
Rj ’s are defined by
Rj =
∫
y∈Aj
MBy d
2y, (16)
where the region of integration Aj in the complex plane
is shown in Fig. 1 and d2y = dRe(y)d Im(y).
From the heterodyne detection, we obtain a probabil-
ity density function P (y) for the outcome y ∈ C. (We
obtain such a probability density function for each con-
ditional state ρxB . While it is more proper to denote
this conditional probability density function as P (y|x),
for simplicity of notation in this section, we use P (y).)
When the heterodyne detector is ideal, this probability
density function is the Husimi Q function. In particular,
as discussed in our previous work [29], the expectation
values of operators qˆ, pˆ, nˆ and dˆ defined in Sec. II B are
related to the Q function via
〈qˆ〉x = 1√
2
∫
(y + y∗)Qx(y)d2y,
〈pˆ〉x = i√
2
∫
(y∗ − y)Qx(y)d2y,
〈nˆ〉x =
∫
(|y|2 − 1)Qx(y)d2y,
〈dˆ〉x =
∫
[y2 + (y∗)2]Qx(y)d2y,
(17)
where the subscript x labels the conditional state ρxB .
In general, one may be interested in a quantity like∫
f(y, y∗)P (y)d2y where f(y, y∗) is a real-valued function
on y and y∗ such that the integral converges. Such a
quantity can be described as the expectation value of an
observable that is defined in the following way
Oˆ =
∫
f(y, y∗)MBy d
2y (18)
since
Tr
[
ρ Oˆ
]
=
∫
d2y f(y, y∗) Tr
(
ρMBy
)
=
∫
d2y f(y, y∗)P (y).
(19)
By comparing Eq. (19) to Eq. (17) and identifying P (y)
by Qx(y), we observe the following choices of f(y, y
∗) for
qˆ, pˆ, nˆ and dˆ:
qˆ ←→ f(y, y∗) = y + y
∗
√
2
,
pˆ←→ f(y, y∗) = i(y
∗ − y∗)√
2
,
nˆ←→ f(y, y∗) = |y|2 − 1,
dˆ←→ f(y, y∗) = y2 + (y∗)2.
(20)
We remark that this way of defining these observables
corresponds to the antinormally ordered expansion of op-
erators [44, 45].
B. Revised optimization problem in the trusted
detector noise scenario
In the trusted detector noise scenario, we can define
observables in a similar way as in the untrusted detec-
tor scenario. In this case, we need to substitute MBy in
Eqs. (16) and (18) by Gy. For the first-moment ob-
servables, we continue to use f(y, y∗) = y+y
∗
√
2
= Re(y)
and f(y, y∗) = i(y
∗−y∗)√
2
= Im(y). However, for the
second-moment observables, we consider operators as-
sociated with f(y, y∗) = (y+y
∗
√
2
)2 = Re(y)2 and with
f(y, y∗) = ( i(y
∗−y)√
2
)2 = Im(y)2 in an agreement with
the actual classical postprocessing in a typical experi-
ment. That is, in a typical experiment, when a hetero-
dyne detection gives two numbers q and p which we set
Re(y) = q and Im(y) = p, one usually computes vari-
ances of Re(y) and Im(y) by computing the expectation
values of Re(y)2 and Im(y)2 in addition to expectation
values of Re(y) and Im(y). By using those choices of
f(y, y∗) in Eq. (18), operators constructed in this way
correspond to expectation values
∫
f(y, y∗)P (y)d2y in a
typical experiment, where P (y) is the underlying proba-
bility density function corresponding to the experimental
data. (Due to our definition of quadrature operators, we
include the factor
√
2 so that we can simply enter val-
ues reported in an experiment using shot noise units as
expectation values of corresponding observables.)
To distinguish operators defined in this way from first-
and second-moment of quadrature operators qˆ and pˆ, we
shall call first-moment observables as FˆQ and FˆP and
second-moment observables as SˆQ and SˆP . They are de-
7fined as
FˆQ =
∫
y + y∗√
2
Gyd
2y,
FˆP =
∫
i(y∗ − y)√
2
Gyd
2y,
SˆQ =
∫
(
y + y∗√
2
)2Gyd
2y,
SˆP =
∫
[
i(y∗ − y)√
2
]2Gyd
2y.
(21)
Then the revised key rate optimization problem be-
comes
minimize D
(G(ρAB)||Z[G(ρAB)])
subject to
Tr
[
ρAB(|x〉〈x|A ⊗ FˆQ)
]
= px〈FˆQ〉x,
Tr
[
ρAB(|x〉〈x|A ⊗ FˆP )
]
= px〈FˆP 〉x,
Tr
[
ρAB(|x〉〈x|A ⊗ SˆQ)
]
= px〈SˆQ〉x,
Tr
[
ρAB(|x〉〈x|A ⊗ SˆP )
]
= px〈SˆP 〉x,
Tr[ρAB ] = 1,
TrB [ρAB ] =
3∑
i,j=0
√
pipj 〈αj |αi〉 |i〉〈j|A ,
ρAB ≥ 0,
(22)
where the index x runs over the set {0, 1, 2, 3}.
In Appendix B, we discuss how to represent these op-
erators in the photon-number basis. Combining with the
photon-number cutoff assumption (i.e. ρAB = (1A ⊗
ΠN )ρAB(1A ⊗ ΠN ), where N is the cutoff photon num-
ber and ΠN is the projection onto the subspace spanned
by the photon-number states from 0 to N photons), we
can directly solve this key rate optimization problem in
Eq. (22) numerically. We direct readers to Sec. IV B
of Ref. [29] for the discussion about the numerical algo-
rithm for the optimization problem and its performance.
V. SIMULATION METHOD
In an experiment, the expectation values shown in the
optimization problem in Eq. (22) can be obtained from
some suitable post-processing of noisy heterodyne detec-
tion results. Without doing experiments, we perform
simulations of a corresponding experiment with a noisy
heterodyne detector to obtain those expectation values.
With these values specified, one can solve the key rate
optimization problem using a numerical convex optimiza-
tion package to obtain numerical results. We emphasize
that our security proof technique does not depend on the
specific channel model used for the simulation.
A. Channel model for simulation
To understand how the protocol behaves in the trusted
detector noise scenario, we simulate the quantum channel
by using a realistic physical channel in an honest imple-
mentation of the protocol. A realistic physical channel
in the context of the optical fiber communication can be
modeled by a phase-invariant Gaussian channel with the
transmittance ηt and excess noise ξ. In a typical fiber
for optical communication, the attenuation coefficient is
0.2 dB/km and thus ηt = 10
−0.02L for a distance L in
kilometers. The excess noise ξ is defined as
ξ =
(∆qobs)
2
(∆qvac)2
− 1, (23)
where (∆qvac)
2 is the variance in q-quadrature of the
vacuum state and (∆qobs)
2 is the observed variance in
q-quadrature of the measured signal state. With our def-
inition of quadrature operators, (∆qvac)
2 = 12 . As the
value of ξ is normalized with respect to the vacuum vari-
ance, the value of ξ is reported in the shot noise units
(SNU) and independent of different conventions of defin-
ing quadrature operators.
Apart from the shot noise, there are several contribu-
tions to the total noise in the measurement data such as
preparation noise, detector noise and noises introduced
in the fiber due to Raman scattering. As we treat the
detection noise as trusted, we assume all other contribu-
tions are under Eve’s control. In other words, all addi-
tional noises beyond the shot noise except the detector
noise become a part of the effective quantum channel
regardless of the physical origin of each noise compo-
nent, and they contribute to the value of the excess noise
ξ. In the literature, the value of the excess noise ξ is
commonly reported at the input of the quantum chan-
nel corresponding to measuring (∆qobs)
2 at the output
of Alice’s lab. By choosing this convention of reporting
the value of excess noise, we may alternatively imagine
that this effective quantum channel first introduces the
amount of excess noise ξ to the signal state at the input
of the channel and the rest of this quantum channel is
then lossy but noise-free. Under this channel model, a
coherent state |α〉, after transmitting through this quan-
tum channel, becomes a displaced thermal state centered
at
√
ηtα with its variance
1
2 (1+ηtξ) for each quadrature.
B. Simulated statistics
From our simulation, the simulated state σxB condi-
tioned on the choice of x is a displaced thermal state
whose Wigner function is
WσxB (γ) =
1
pi
1
1
2 (1 + ηtξ)
exp
[
−
∣∣γ −√ηtαx∣∣2
1
2 (1 + ηtξ)
]
. (24)
8When Bob applies his heterodyne measurement de-
scribed by the POVM {Gy}, the probability density func-
tion P (y|x) for the measurement outcome y conditioned
on Alice’s choice x is
P (y|x) = 1
pi(1 + 12ηdηtξ + νel)
exp
[
−
∣∣y −√ηdηtαx∣∣2
1 + 12ηdηtξ + νel
]
.
(25)
The observables defined in Eq. (21) have the following
expectation values from the simulation:
〈FˆQ〉x =
√
2ηdηt Re(αx),
〈FˆP 〉x =
√
2ηdηt Im(αx),
〈SˆQ〉x = 2ηdηt Re(αx)2 + 1 + 1
2
ηdηtξ + νel,
〈SˆP 〉x = 2ηdηt Im(αx)2 + 1 + 1
2
ηdηtξ + νel.
(26)
C. Estimation of error correction cost
We estimate the cost of error correction from the sim-
ulated statistics. From the probability density function
P (y|x) shown in Eq. (25), we can obtain the joint prob-
ability distribution P˜ (x, z) for Alice’s choice X = x and
Bob’s discretized key value Z = z by the following inte-
gral
P˜ (z|x) =
∫ ∞
∆a
dr r
∫ 2z+1
4 pi
2z−1
4 pi
dθP (reiθ|x). (27)
Since P˜ (x) = px =
1
4 , we then obtain the joint proba-
bility distribution P˜ (x, z) = P˜ (z|x)P˜ (x). Using the def-
inition of I(X;Z) in terms of P˜ (x, z), we can approx-
imate the cost of error correction by Eq. (6) for the
reverse reconciliation scheme considered in this work.
When ∆a is not zero, that is, in the presence of post-
selection, the sifting factor ppass is the sum of P˜ (x, z)
over x, z ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. We then renormalize the proba-
bility distribution before plugging it in the definition of
I(X;Z).
VI. KEY RATE IN THE ABSENCE OF
POSTSELECTION
In this section, we present results when no postselec-
tion is performed, that is, ∆a = 0. We make two compar-
isons. The first one is to compare key rates in the trusted
and untrusted detector noise scenarios. The second one is
to analyze how different imperfections in detectors affect
key rates in the trusted detector noise scenario.
A. Comparison between trusted and untrusted
detector noise scenarios
For this comparison, we supply the same set of sim-
ulated data from Eq. (26) to the optimization problem
for the untrusted detector noise scenario in Eq. (8) and
the one for the trusted detector noise scenario in Eq.
(22). For simulation, we choose parameters ηd = 0.719,
νel = 0.01 from [13] for illustration. The result is shown
in Fig. 3.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
K
e
y
 r
a
te
 p
e
r 
p
u
ls
e
 (
lo
g
-s
ca
le
) Untrusted detector noise
Trusted detector noise
Effective channel excess noise
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
E
ff
e
ct
iv
e
 c
h
a
n
n
e
l 
e
x
ce
ss
 n
o
is
e
 ξ
ef
f
FIG. 3. Secure key rate versus the transmission distance for
untrusted detector noise (black diamonds) and trusted detec-
tor noise (red stars) scenarios. The excess noise is ξ = 0.01
at the input of the quantum channel. Parameters for detec-
tor are ηd = 0.719, νel = 0.01[13]. The coherent state ampli-
tude is optimized via a coarse-grained search over the interval
[0.5, 0.9] with a step size of 0.05 and the channel transmittance
is ηt = 10
−0.02L for each distance L in kilometers. The effec-
tive channel excess noise in the untrusted detector scenario is
shown with the y-axis on the right. At 20 km, the effective
channel excess noise ξeff is roughly 0.045.
As we can see from this figure, the key rate of the un-
trusted detector noise scenario drops quickly at a short
distance less than 20 km even though the electronic noise
is only 0.01 SNU, which is a low value compared to detec-
tors used in many other CV experiments. On the other
hand, the key rate in the trusted detector noise scenario
extends to much longer distances, which exhibits a sim-
ilar behavior as the results shown in Ref. [29] when the
detector is treated as ideal. One explanation for this be-
havior is that in Ref. [29], we have observed that the
key rate for the QPSK scheme drops quickly when the
channel excess noise ξ is large. Since the value of ξ is
reported at the input of the quantum channel while the
value of νel is measured at Bob’s side, to treat νel as
a part of channel excess noise in the untrusted detector
noise scenario, one needs to define the effective value of
ξ to include the value of νel. For the effective value ξeff,
the electronic noise νel needs to be scaled by a factor of
1/ηt (in addition to 1/ηd), which is large for slightly long
distances as ηt becomes small. As a result, the redefined
value ξeff of ξ is quite large as shown in Fig. 3 and this
behavior of key rate is then expected. By the observa-
9tion made from this figure, it is not surprised that for a
larger value of electronic noise, the key rate in the un-
trusted detector noise scenario would drop to zero at an
even shorter distance.
B. Detector imperfection in the trusted detector
noise scenario
To guide the experimental implementation of the
QPSK scheme, we may be interested in the robustness
of the protocol in the presence of detector inefficiency
and electronic noise in the trusted detector noise sce-
nario. For this purpose, we investigate the effects of dif-
ferent levels of detector efficiency and electronic noise on
the key rate. For curves in Figs. 4 and 5, our simula-
tion uses the same channel model but different detector
imperfections, that is, in Eq. (26), the same values of
channel parameters ηt and ξ but different values of de-
tector efficiency ηd and electronic noise νel (as specified
in the captions) for different curves.
In Fig. 4, we choose values of ηd and νel for a homo-
dyne detector from two experiments [11, 13] and compare
these results with the ideal detector. For the comparison,
we optimize α via a coarse-grained search for each dis-
tance. We see that with a noisy heterodyne detector, the
key rate drops moderately from the key rate of using an
ideal detector. The amount of decrease is like a constant
prefactor in the key rate. As the detector is nosier, the
key rate becomes lower as expected.
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FIG. 4. Secure key rate versus transmission distance for
different detector imperfections reported in experiments in a
comparison to the ideal detector. Other parameters are the
excess noise ξ = 0.01, error-correction efficiency β = 0.95 and
the transmittance ηt = 10
−0.02L for each distance L in kilo-
meters. For each distance, the coherent state amplitude α is
optimized via a coarse-grained search in the interval [0.5, 0.9]
with a step size of 0.05. Black curve with diamond markers is
for the ideal heterodyne detector; red curve with star markers
is for the detector used in Ref. [13]; Cyan curve with square
markers is for the detector used in Ref. [11].
To show that different values of electronic noise have
little impacts on the secure key rates in the trusted noise
scenario, we compare key rates with two choices of the
electronic noise value in Fig. 5a while we fix the value of
detector efficiency ηd to be 0.7. As the key rate difference
is relatively small between the curve with νel = 0.05 and
that with νel = 0.08, we also plot the difference of key
rate (that is, the key rate with νel = 0.05 minus the key
rate with νel = 0.08) in the same figure. (Note that the
non-smoothness in the curve of difference is due to the
coarse-grained search for the coherent state amplitude in
the presence of the numerical performance issue discussed
in Ref. [29].) We observe that when the electronic noise
is trusted, its impact on the secure key rates is insignifi-
cant. This result eases the requirements of a detector in a
CVQKD experiment with the QPSK scheme. Similarly,
we investigate the effects of detector efficiency in Fig. 5b.
In particular, we fix the value of electronic noise νel to
be 0.05 SNU and plot four choices of detector efficiency
between 0.5 and 0.8. We see the key rate curves are close
to each other.
In Fig. 6, we investigate the tradeoff between trust-
ing the detector efficiency and lumping it together with
the channel transmittance, similar to a scenario studied
in Ref. [46] for discrete-variable systems. For the fixed
amount of total transmittance η := ηtηd, it is interesting
to see how trusting different values of detector efficiency
affects the key rate. We observe that when the value
of the product of channel transmittance ηt and detec-
tor efficiency ηd is fixed, if the detector efficiency ηd is
lower, meaning that the more contribution to the total
transmittance η is trusted, then the key rate is higher.
This observation is similar to the observation made for
discrete-variable systems in Ref. [46].
To summarize, in a discrete modulation experiment, if
one is able to obtain accurate values of ηd and νel by
a suitable calibration procedure and able to maintain
a low level of the effective channel excess noise ξ to a
value like 0.01, then the QPSK scheme is able to extend
to a distance beyond 100 km in the asymptotic regime.
We remark that the optimal amplitude for the QPSK
scheme in the trusted detector noise scenario is around
0.75 corresponding to a mean photon number of around
0.56, similar to the optimal amplitude in the ideal or un-
trusted detector noise scenario reported in our previous
work [29]. This mean photon number is much lower than
that for Gaussian modulation schemes.
VII. KEY RATE WITH POSTSELECTION
In this section, we investigate the effects of postselec-
tion in the trusted detector noise scenario. As demon-
strated in our previous analysis [29], postselection of data
can improve the key rate of QPSK scheme in the un-
trusted detector noise scenario. Postselection is simple
to implement in an experiment. It not only improves the
key rate but also reduces the required volume of data
postprocessing. Thus, it is advantageous to include a
postselection step in the protocol. As expected, we show
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FIG. 5. Secure key rate versus transmission distance for dif-
ferent detector imperfections with the excess noise ξ = 0.01.
For both plots, the coherent state amplitude is optimized via
a coarse-grained search over the interval [0.5, 0.9] with a step
size 0.05 and β = 0.95. (a) Comparison of key rates between
two values of the electronic noise when the detector efficiency
is set to be ηd = 0.7 for both curves. The difference of two
curves is also plotted with the secondary y-axis on the right.
(b) Comparison of key rates for different values of detector
efficiency when the electronic noise is νel = 0.05.
here that this advantage also exists in the trusted detec-
tor noise scenario.
In Fig. 7, we search for the optimal postselection pa-
rameter for different transmission distances and take the
distances L = 50 km and L = 75 km as examples. For
this figure, we also optimize the choice of coherent state
amplitude via a coarse-grained search. The x-axis in
each plot is the postselection parameter ∆a. We observe
the optimal value of the postselection parameter ∆a is
around 0.6 for both L = 50 km and L = 75 km. We
also observe that the optimal choice of the postselection
parameter ∆a does not change significantly for different
distances.
In Fig. 8, we show the key rate as a function of trans-
mission distance for two scenarios: with or without post-
selection. Since the optimal postselection parameter does
not change significantly for different distances, we opti-
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FIG. 6. Secure key rate versus the detector efficiency ηd
for a fixed value of total transmittance η := ηtηd = 0.3155.
This figure studies the tradeoff between the key rate and
the amount of trusted loss. Other parameters are the ex-
cess noise ξ = 0.01, the electronic noise νel = 0.01 and the
error-correction efficiency β = 0.95. We include two curves
for different choices of coherent state amplitude α.
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FIG. 7. (a) Secure key rate versus postselection parameter
∆a for L = 50 km. (b) Secure key rate versus postselection
parameter ∆a for L = 75 km. For both plots, the channel
excess noise is ξ = 0.01 and the error-correction efficiency
β = 0.95. The coherent state amplitude is optimized via
a coarse-grained search in the interval [0.6, 0.8] with a step
size of 0.05. Parameters for detectors are ηd = 0.552 and
νel = 0.015 from [11].
mize the postselection parameter ∆a via a coarse-grained
search in a restricted interval. For this figure, we fix the
coherent state amplitude to be 0.75 and the channel ex-
cess noise ξ to be 0.01. We see postselection can indeed
improve the key rate. The percentage of improvement
compared to the key rate without postselection is roughly
between 5% to 8% and the probability of being postse-
lected is around 70% to 80%. Thus, postselection can
reduce the amount of data for postprocessing by around
20% to 30% while improving the key rate.
We end this section with a remark on the postselection
pattern. The postselection pattern (see Fig. 1) studied
in this work is a simple, intuitive and convenient choice
when we evaluate the region operators. However, it is not
11
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FIG. 8. Comparison of key rates with or without postse-
lection. Detector parameters are from [11] where ηd = 0.552
and νel = 0.015. The difference of two curves is also plot-
ted with the secondary y-axis on the right. Other parameters
are the channel excess noise ξ = 0.01, the coherent state am-
plitude α = 0.75 and the error-correction efficiency β = 0.95.
The postselection parameter is optimized via a coarse-grained
search in the interval [0.45,0.7] with a step size 0.05.
necessarily the optimal way to postselect data [7, 47]. It
is an interesting future work to investigate other patterns
of postselection.
VIII. SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We have provided a method to analyze the asymptotic
security of a discrete modulation scheme of CVQKD in
the trusted detector noise scenario where both non-unity
detector efficiency and electronic noise are trusted. In
particular, we find the POVM elements corresponding
to a noisy heterodyne detector. As we demonstrate our
method on the quadrature phase-shift keying scheme, we
show that when the detector imperfection is trusted, the
key rates are similar to the one with the ideal hetero-
dyne detector studied previously [29]. Our new analysis
eases the requirements of an experimental implementa-
tion of the discrete modulation scheme as the detector
imperfection is usually a major source of noise.
We point out the limitations in the current work. First,
the analysis in this work is still restricted to the asymp-
totic scenario. As we recently extend the underlying nu-
merical method used in this security analysis to finite-key
regime [36], we hope to perform the finite key analysis
for this protocol. However, there remains technical chal-
lenges to solve before such an analysis can be carried out
and thus we leave the finite key analysis for future work.
The second limitation is the same photon-number cutoff
assumption used in Refs. [28, 29]. While numerical ev-
idences show that our results are stable when the cutoff
photon number is chosen appropriately, we would like to
have a more rigorous analysis on the effects of truncation
in future work. Third, for the ease of calculation, we
give the POVM elements of a noisy heterodyne detector
in a simple scenario where two homodyne components are
treated as identical. However, our principles presented in
this paper work for the general case where two detectors
are not identical. To handle the general case, one may
choose to find the matrix elements 〈m|Gy |n〉 by numer-
ical integration. One concern is that since observables
are defined in terms of integration of Gy, it may become
numerically challenging to perform several integrals at
the same time. Alternatively, one may first find a way
to simplify the expression analytically similar to what we
have done for the simple case. In an experiment, if two
homodyne detectors in the heterodyne detection scheme
can be chosen to be as similar as possible, we expect that
the analysis in this simple case can produce reasonably
tight key rates. Nevertheless, the analysis in the gen-
eral case is still useful to improve the key rates in this
scenario. However, if two detectors used in an experi-
ment have quite different imperfections, we then have to
use the noisy heterodyne detector POVM without the
aforementioned simplification. It remains as a technical
question to efficiently compute the matrix elements of
this POVM in the photon-number basis, which we expect
can be solved. Nevertheless, this current limitation does
not affect the principles and methodology we present in
this work about the treatment of trusted detector noise.
It is also expected that observations in the general case
will be similar to observations we have made here in the
simple case.
Finally, we remark on the generality of our method
of treating trusted detector noise. If a different physical
model of a detector is adopted (which needs to be ver-
ified experimentally), we expect that a similar method
as described here can be used to find a correct POVM
description for the given physical model and then this
POVM can be used in the security analysis.
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APPENDIX A: Derivation of noisy heterodyne
detection POVM via Wigner functions
1. Basic Wigner functions
As we use the Wigner function approach for our deriva-
tion, we recall useful expressions from Ref. [48] for later
references.
To calculate Tr(FG) for two operators F and G in
terms of their Wigner functions WF and WG, the overlap
formula is
Tr(FG) = pi
∫
d2α WF (α)WG(α). (A1)
We can easily generalize the formula to the multi-mode
case. The input-output Wigner functions under a beam
splitter transformation whose transmittance is η are re-
lated by
Wout(α, β) = Win(
√
ηα+
√
1− ηβ,
√
1− ηα−√ηβ).
(A2)
We list Wigner functions for some important quantum
states below. The Wigner function of a vacuum state |0〉
is
W|0〉(γ) =
2
pi
e−2|γ|
2
. (A3)
The Wigner function of a displaced thermal state
Dˆ(α)ρth(n¯)Dˆ
†(α) with the thermal state’s mean photon
number n¯ before the displacement and the amount of
displacement α is
WDˆ(α)ρth(n¯)Dˆ†(α)(γ) =
2
pi
1
1 + 2n¯
e−
2|γ−α|2
1+2n¯ . (A4)
If we set α = 0, it reduces to the Wigner function of a
thermal state ρth(n¯) with a mean photon number n¯:
Wρth(n¯)(γ) =
2
pi
1
1 + 2n¯
e−
2|γ|2
1+2n¯ . (A5)
2. Derivation
As the physical model of a noisy heterodyne detector
is presented in Fig. 2, our goal here is to find the cor-
responding POVM elements that correctly produce the
probability density function P (y) of obtaining an out-
come y ∈ C for an arbitrary input state ρ to the detec-
tor. In our trusted noise model, the homodyne detector
for the q-quadrature measurement has its detector effi-
ciency η1 and electronic noise ν1 which is related to a
thermal state of the mean photon number n¯1 =
ν1
2(1−η1) .
Similarly, the homodyne detector for the p-quadrature
measurement has its detector efficiency η2 and electronic
noise ν2 which corresponds to a thermal state with the
FIG. 9. A concise but equivalent view of the noisy heterodyne
detector model depicited in Fig. 2. Input modes are labeled
in terms of Wigner functions.
mean photon number n¯2 =
v2
2(1−η2) . Fig. 9 shows a com-
pact but equivalent representation of Fig. 2 with Wigner
functions associated to input modes. In this setup, for
an output state Wout(α, β, γ, ω) at the step labeled in
Fig. 9, we measure the q-quadrature of the mode α
and p-quadrature of the mode β with two ideal homo-
dyne detectors, and discard the rest modes γ and ω. The
Wigner function of an ideal homodyne detector for the
q-quadrature measurement that produces a measurement
outcome Re(y) is WHRe(y)(α) = δ(Re(α)− Re(y)√2 ) where δ
is the Dirac delta function and similarly, the one for the
p-quadrature measurement with a measurement outcome
Im(y) is WHIm(y)(α) = δ(Im(α) − Im(y)√2 ). The factor
√
2
is included such that we can rederive the ideal hetero-
dyne detector POVM {Ey} in the limit of unity detector
efficiency and zero electronic noise. To discard modes γ
and ω that are not measured, we perform the integration
over variables γ and ω.
For any input state ρ to the detector, one can in prin-
ciple obtain the underlying probability density function
P (y) = Tr(ρGy) for every measurement outcome y ∈ C.
As the correct POVM element Gy needs to produce the
observed probability density function P (y) = Tr(ρGy),
this requirement in terms of Wigner functions becomes
P (y) = pi
∫
d2αWρ(α)WGy (α), where Wρ is the Wigner
function of the input state ρ and WGy is the Wigner func-
tion of the operator Gy, by the overlap formula in Eq.
(A1). In Fig. 9, we know the mathematical description
of measurements on the right, but the description of the
state Wout is unknown. On the other hand, we want to
find the description of the measurement directly acting
on the input state and the Wigner function description
of the input state and those of ancillary modes on the
left are either assumed to be given or known. To connect
these known descriptions on the two sides of this dia-
gram to find the desired Wigner function of the POVM
element Gy that acts on the input state directly, we start
from the right hand side of this diagram with an unknown
four-mode state Wout and the known measurements on
these modes, perform inverse beam splitter transforma-
13
tions from right to left of this diagram and finally obtain
WGy by integrating over variables other than α. By start-
ing with the multi-mode overlap formula for P (y) on the
right-hand side of the diagram and performing the pro-
cess as described, we obtain
P (y) = pi4
∫
d2α
∫
d2β
∫
d2γ
∫
d2ω Wout(α, β, γ, ω)WHRe(y)(α)WHIm(y)(β)
1
pi2
= pi2
∫
d2α Wρ(α)
∫
d2β W|0〉(β)
∫
d2γ Wρth(n¯1)(γ)WHRe(y)(
√
η1
α+ β√
2
+
√
1− η1γ)
×
∫
d2ω Wρth(n¯2)(ω)WHIm(y)(
√
η2
α− β√
2
+
√
1− η2ω).
(A6)
The next step is to substitute the Wigner function of the vacuum state in Eq. (A3) and that of the displaced thermal
state in Eq. (A5) and then to perform the integrals over variables β, γ and ω. We first integrate over the variable ω.
The relevant integral that involves the variable ω is∫
d2ω Wρth(n¯2)(ω)WHIm(y)(
√
η2
α− β√
2
+
√
1− η2ω)
=
1
pi
√
pi
1√
(1− η2)(1 + 2n¯2)
exp
(
−
η2[Im(β) +
1√
η2
Im(y)− Im(α)]2
(1 + 2n¯2)(1− η2)
)
.
(A7)
Next, we perform the integral related to the variable γ. Since Eq. (A7) does not involve the variable γ, we do not
need to plug it back to solve the integral that involves the variable γ. This integration shown in Eq. (A8) is actually
similar to the integration that we just did in Eq. (A7).
∫
d2γ Wρth(n¯1)(γ)WHRe(y)(
√
η1
α+ β√
2
+
√
1− η1γ) = 1
pi
√
pi
1√
(1− η1)(1 + 2n¯1)
exp
−η1[Re(β)− 1√η1 Re(y) + Re(α)]2
(1 + 2n¯1)(1− η1)
.
(A8)
Finally, we integrate over the variable β. We now need to substitute results of Eqs. (A7) and (A8) back to Eq. (A6).
The prefactor is simplified to be 1pi3
1√
(1−η1)(1+2n¯1)(1−η2)(1+2n¯2)
. Besides this prefactor, we perform the following
integral
∫
d2β W0(β) exp
−η1[Re(β)− 1√η1 Re(y) + Re(α)]2
(1 + 2n¯1)(1− η1)
 exp
−η2[(Im(β) + 1√η2 Im(y)− Im(α)]2
(1 + 2n¯2)(1− η2)

=2
√
(1 + 2n¯1)(1 + 2n¯2)(1− η1)(1− η2)
(1 + (1− η1) + 4n¯1(1− η1))(1 + (1− η2) + 4n¯2(1− η2))
× exp
−2η1[ 1√η1 Re(y)− Re(α)]2
1 + (1− η1) + 4n¯1(1− η1) +
−2η2
[
1√
η2
Im(y)− Im(α)]2
1 + (1− η2) + 4n¯2(1− η2)
.
(A9)
Finally, by putting the prefactor back and expressing the final expression in a format of Gaussian functions, we
obtain the following result
WGy (α) =
1√
η1η2pi
2
pi
1√
1 + 2(1−η1)(1+2n¯1)η1
1√
1 + 2(1−η2)(1+2n¯2)η2
× exp
(−2( 1√η1 Re(y)− Re(α))2
1 + 2(1−η1)(1+2n¯1)η1
+
−2( 1√η2 Im(y)− Im(α))2
1 + 2(1−η2)(1+2n¯2)η2
)
.
(A10)
By substituting in n¯1 =
ν1
2(1−η1) and n¯2 =
ν2
2(1−η2) , we derive Eq. (12) after a straightforward simplification.
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APPENDIX B: Photon-number basis representation of operators
In this Appendix, we show how to represent region operators as well as observables needed for the optimization
problem in Eq. (22) in the photon-number basis. By the same discussion in Appendix B of Ref. [29], under the
photon-number cutoff assumption, we need only ΠN OˆΠN for an operator Oˆ with a cutoff photon number N . Thus,
we are interested in finding the expression 〈m| Oˆ |n〉 for 0 ≤ m,n ≤ N for each relevant operator Oˆ. In this Appendix,
we restrict the discussion to the scenario where we set η1 = η2 = ηd and ν1 = ν2 = νel. The POVM element Gy in
the photon-number basis is expressed as [43]
〈m|Gy |n〉 = 1
ηdpi
exp
[
− |y|
2
ηd(1 + n¯d)
]
n¯md
(1 + n¯d)n+1
(
y∗√
ηd
)n−m(
m!
n!
)1/2L(n−m)m
(
− |y|
2
ηdn¯d(1 + n¯d)
)
, (B1)
where we define n¯d =
1−ηd+νel
ηd
for ease of writing and L
(j)
k (x) is the generalized Laguerre polynomial of degree k with
a parameter j in the variable x. In particular, the diagonal entries are simplified to be
〈n|Gy |n〉 = 1
ηdpi
exp
[
− |y|
2
ηd(1 + n¯d)
]
n¯nd
(1 + n¯d)n+1
Ln(− |y|
2
ηdn¯d(1 + n¯d)
), (B2)
where Lk(x) = L
(0)
k (x) is the Laguerre polynomial of degree k in the variable x. For ease of writing later, we define
Cm,n =
1
piη
(n−m)/2+1
d
(m!n! )
1/2 n¯
m
d
(1+n¯d)n+1
.
1. Region operators
Our goal here is to write region operators Rj =
∫
y∈Aj Gy d
2y in the photon-number basis. For simplicity, we work
out the expressions in the absence of postselection. To include the postselection, one may numerically integrate over
the discarded region and subtract this result from the expression without postselection since this numerical integration
is efficiently computable in MATLAB. We first consider off-diagonal elements (i.e. m 6= n). In this case, we plug
the expression of 〈m|Gy |n〉 in Eq. (B1) into the definition of Rj in Eq. (16), write it in the polar coordinate with
y = reiθ and perform the integration over the phase θ to obtain the following expressions.
〈m|R0 |n〉 =
∫ ∞
0
dr r
∫ pi/4
−pi/4
dθ 〈m|Greiθ |n〉
= Cm,n
2 sin[m−n4 pi]
m− n
∫ ∞
0
dr exp
[
− r
2
ηd(1 + n¯d)
]
L(n−m)m
(
− r
2
ηdn¯d(1 + n¯d)
)
rn−m+1.
(B3)
〈m|R1 |n〉 =
∫ ∞
0
dr r
∫ 3pi/4
pi/4
dθ 〈m|Greiθ |n〉
= Cm,n
i(1− im−n)ei(m−n)pi/4
m− n
∫ ∞
0
dr exp
[
− r
2
ηd(1 + n¯d)
]
L(n−m)m
(
− r
2
ηdn¯d(1 + n¯d)
)
rn−m+1.
(B4)
〈m|R2 |n〉 =
∫ ∞
0
dr r
∫ 5pi/4
3pi/4
dθ 〈m|Greiθ |n〉
= Cm,n
2(−1)m+n sin[m−n4 pi]
m− n
∫ ∞
0
dr exp
[
− r
2
ηd(1 + n¯d)
]
L(n−m)m
(
− r
2
ηdn¯d(1 + n¯d)
)
rn−m+1.
(B5)
〈m|R3 |n〉 =
∫ ∞
0
dr r
∫ 7pi/4
5pi/4
dθ 〈m|Greiθ |n〉
= Cm,n
i(1− im−n)e5i(m−n)pi/4
m− n
∫ ∞
0
dr exp
[
− r
2
ηd(1 + n¯d)
]
L(n−m)m
(
− r
2
ηdn¯d(1 + n¯d)
)
rn−m+1.
(B6)
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We notice that the integral over r is a common integral in these four equations. We now perform this common
integral to obtain the result in terms of Taylor series expansion of a simple function.∫ ∞
0
dr exp
[
− r
2
ηd(1 + n¯d)
]
L(n−m)m
(
− r
2
ηdn¯d(1 + n¯d)
)
rn−m+1
=
1
2
[ηd(1 + n¯d)]
n−m
2 +1Γ(
n−m
2
+ 1)fm(n¯d, n−m, n−m
2
),
(B7)
where Γ is the gamma function and fm(a, α, k) is defined as the Taylor series coefficients of the function below in the
variable t as
(1− t)−α+k(1− (1 + 1
a
)t)−(k+1) =
∞∑
n=0
fn(a, α, k)t
n. (B8)
We note that the Taylor series coefficients here can be quickly found in MATLAB.
Now, we consider the diagonal entries of Rj (i.e. m = n). By substituting y = re
iθ in Eq. (B2), we note that
this expression does not depend on θ. Thus, it is easy to see 〈n|R0 |n〉 = 〈n|R1 |n〉 = 〈n|R2 |n〉 = 〈n|R3 |n〉 . The
integration over the phase θ gives a factor of pi2 . We proceed the integration over variable r and obtain
〈n|Rj |n〉 = pi
2
1
ηdpi
∫ ∞
0
dr r exp
[
− r
2
η(1 + n¯d)
]
n¯nd
(1 + n¯d)n+1
Ln
(
− r
2
ηdn¯d(1 + n¯d)
)
=
1
4
n¯nd
(1 + n¯d)n
(1 +
1
n¯d
)n =
1
4
.
(B9)
To include postselection, the common integral in the case m 6= n becomes∫ ∞
∆a
dr exp
[
− r
2
ηd(1 + n¯d)
]
L(n−m)m
(
− r
2
ηdn¯d(1 + n¯d)
)
rn−m+1
=
1
2
[ηd(1 + n¯d)]
n−m
2 +1Γ(
n−m
2
+ 1)fm(n¯d, n−m, n−m
2
)−
∫ ∆a
0
dr exp
[
− r
2
ηd(1 + n¯d)
]
L(n−m)m
(
− r
2
ηdn¯d(1 + n¯d)
)
rn−m+1,
(B10)
where the second term is efficiently computable numerically. The case for m = n follows similarly.
2. First-moment observables
We then proceed to evaluate the matrix elements of FˆQ and FˆP . In the photon number basis, the matrix elements
are
〈m| FˆQ |n〉 =
∫
y + y∗√
2
〈m|Gy |n〉 d2y
=
Cm,n√
2
∫ ∞
0
dr exp
[
− r
2
ηd(1 + n¯d)
]
L(n−m)m
(
− r
2
ηdn¯d(1 + n¯d)
)
rn−m+2
∫ 2pi
0
dθ e−i(n−m)θ(eiθ + e−iθ)
〈m| FˆP |n〉 =
∫
i(y∗ − y)√
2
〈m|Gy |n〉 d2y
=
iCm,n√
2
∫ ∞
0
dr exp
[
− r
2
ηd(1 + n¯d)
]
L(n−m)m
(
− r
2
ηdn¯d(1 + n¯d)
)
rn−m+2
∫ 2pi
0
dθ e−i(n−m)θ(e−iθ − eiθ)
(B11)
As FˆQ is a Hermitian operator, we can first find entries 〈m| FˆQ |n〉 for m ≤ n. Then for m > n, we simply set
〈m| FˆQ |n〉 to be the complex conjugate of 〈n| FˆQ |m〉. From the integration over θ, the nonzero entries for m ≤ n are
〈m| FˆQ |m+ 1〉 =
√
2piCm,m+1
∫ ∞
0
dr exp
[
− r
2
ηd(1 + n¯d)
]
L(1)m
(
− r
2
ηdn¯d(1 + n¯d)
)
r3
=
pi√
2
Cm,m+1((1 + n¯d)ηd)
2fm(n¯d, 1, 1).
(B12)
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By a similar procedure for FˆP , we have
〈m| FˆP |m+ 1〉 = −
√
2ipiCm,m+1
∫ ∞
0
dr exp
[
− r
2
ηd(1 + n¯d)
]
L(1)m
(
− r
2
ηdn¯d(1 + n¯d)
)
r3
= − ipi√
2
Cm,m+1((1 + n¯d)ηd)
2fm(n¯d, 1, 1).
(B13)
3. Second-moment observables
Next, we evaluate the matrix elements of SˆQ and SˆP . In the photon-number basis, they are
〈m| SˆQ |n〉 =
∫
(
y + y∗√
2
)2 〈m|Gy |n〉 d2y
=
Cm,n
2
∫ ∞
0
dr exp
[
− r
2
ηd(1 + n¯d)
]
L(n−m)m
(
− r
2
ηdn¯d(1 + n¯d)
)
rn−m+3
∫ 2pi
0
dθ e−i(n−m)θ(eiθ + e−iθ)2,
〈m| SˆP |n〉 =
∫
(
i(y∗ − y)√
2
)2 〈m|Gy |n〉 d2y
= −Cm,n
2
∫ ∞
0
dr exp
[
− r
2
ηd(1 + n¯d)
]
L(n−m)m
(
− r
2
ηdn¯d(1 + n¯d)
)
rn−m+3
∫ 2pi
0
dθ e−i(n−m)θ(e−iθ − eiθ)2.
(B14)
Again, since SˆQ and SˆP are Hermitian operators, we only need to define the upper triangular part and then set the
lower triangular part using the Hermitian property. The relevant integrals are simplified to be
〈m| SˆQ |m〉 = 2piCm,m
∫ ∞
0
dr exp
[
− r
2
ηd(1 + n¯d)
]
Lm
(
− r
2
ηdn¯d(1 + n¯d)
)
r3
= piCm,m(ηd(1 + n¯d))
2fm(n¯d, 0, 1),
〈m| SˆQ |m+ 2〉 = piCm,m+2
∫ ∞
0
dr exp
[
− r
2
ηd(1 + n¯d)
]
L(2)m
(
− r
2
ηdn¯d(1 + n¯d)
)
r5
= piCm,m+2(ηd(1 + n¯d))
3fm(n¯d, 2, 2).
(B15)
For SˆP , we have
〈m| SˆP |m〉 = 2piCm,m
∫ ∞
0
dr exp
[
− r
2
ηd(1 + n¯d)
]
Lm
(
− r
2
ηdn¯d(1 + n¯d)
)
r3
= piCm,m(ηd(1 + n¯d))
2fm(n¯d, 0, 1),
〈m| SˆP |m+ 2〉 = −piCm,m+2
∫ ∞
0
dr exp
[
− r
2
ηd(1 + n¯d)
]
L(2)m
(
− r
2
ηdn¯d(1 + n¯d)
)
r5
= −piCm,m+2(ηd(1 + n¯d))3fm(n¯d, 2, 2).
(B16)
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